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Abstract. This paper introduces a procedural method based
on fuzzy logic to analyze systematic the risk of an elec-
tronic system in an intentional electromagnetic environment
(IEME). The method analyzes the susceptibility of a com-
plex electronic installation with respect to intentional elec-
tromagnetic interference (IEMI). It combines the advantages
of well-known techniques as fault tree analysis (FTA), elec-
tromagnetic topology (EMT) and Bayesian networks (BN)
and extends the techniques with an approach to handle un-
certainty. This approach uses fuzzy sets, membership func-
tions and fuzzy logic to handle the uncertainty with proba-
bility functions and linguistic terms. The linguistic terms add
to the risk analysis the knowledge from experts of the inves-
tigated system or environment.
1 Introduction
Intentional electromagnetic interferences (IEMI) are able to
disturb susceptible electronic systems (Hoad et al., 2004;
Nitsch et ak., 2004). In our modern society, the dependency
on electronic systems is still increasing and their continuous
functioning is highly desirable. That requirement is opposed
by an increasing vulnerability of electronic devices caused
by the strong interconnection of such systems. Therefore, the
breakdown of only one subsystem can lead to a failure of the
whole system. Because of growing risk and the huge com-
plexity of highly interconnected electronic devices, a statis-
tical model representing the real system is required (Bedfort
and Cooke, 2001).
There are different methods that are usually applied in
the risk analysis, e.g. the electromagnetic topology (EMT)
(Baum, 1980) approach, the fault tree analysis (FTA)
(Genender et al., 2011b) and Bayesian networks (BN) (Mao
and Zhou, 2010; Mao et al., 2011). To calculate the risk with
one of these three methods, it is necessary to acquire all the
data for the calculation by many different measurements of
its subsystems. For example, the breakdown behavior (Camp
et al., 2004) of one subsystem needs to be analyzed for dif-
ferent angles of incidence. These three methods require pre-
cise values for the system to be examined and are limited in
handling uncertain information. In contrast, to an exact anal-
ysis some parts of the interaction between source and test
object can only be described by imprecise and non-technical
attributes evaluating their mobility, technological challenge
and hazard level (Sabath and Garbe, 2015). A typical ex-
ample is the probability of occurrence of IEMI sources. For
this reason a statistical method is needed, which is capable
to calculate the risk of a complex system, despite the fact of
having uncertain information. A common method to handle
these uncertainties is the fuzzy logic (Viertl, 2011), which
will combined the advantages of the three analytic methods.
Based on the introduced theoretical approach published in
Peikert et al. (2015), the risk estimation with fuzzy is demon-
strated for a real complex electronic system and its environ-
ment. A compound of different microcontroller circuits are
exemplary used as a complex electronic system. The advan-
tage of the fuzzy logic is, that its mathematical model is a
multi-valued logic in contrast to the typical Boolean logic, 0
or 1. The truth values in fuzzy logic can be any real number
between 0 and 1. Furthermore, this approach can describe
the behavior of a system with linguistic terms (Aliev, 2013).
For example, they can be used to express the probability of
occurrence of IEMI sources with technical and non-technical
attributes. These linguistic terms are described with the fuzzy
set theory, which maps the behavior into membership func-
tions. This approach leads to a combination of exact and im-
precise values for physical and technical attributes. Also, the
approach includes non-technical attributes, which are only
could describe by linguistic terms. For example, the opinion
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Table 1. An example for operation on Fuzzy Sets
A∪B A∩B Aˆ= 1−µA
x : µA(x)= 0.5 µB (x)= 0.1 x = 0.5 x = 0.1 x = 0.5
y : µA(y)= 0.6 µB (y)= 0.4 x = 0.6 x = 0.4 x = 0.4
z : µA(z)= 0.1 µB (z)= 0.7 x = 0.7 x = 0.1 x = 0.9
A Ç B Α È Β
A A AB B
Â Α È Β
A B
	a) 	b) 	c) 	d)
x
y
z
Figure 1. Fuzzy-Logic operator: disjunction, conjunction and complement.
of experts of the needed knowledge to develop a disturbance
source.
2 Fuzzy approach to determine the risk
The fuzzy approach (Peikert et al., 2015) is divided into two
main parts, the fuzzy set theory and the fuzzy logic. The set
theory (Zadeh, 1965) allows an object belonging to multiple
exclusive sets. Instead to the classical set theory in which an
individual object is either a member or non-member of a set.
Due to insufficient knowledge or imprecise data of a system,
it is often impossible to definite assign an object is belonging
to a set or not.
The fuzzy set A˜ of X is characterized by a membership
function µA(x) which is associated with a number in the in-
terval [0,1], representing the degree of x belonging to X and
is expressed with the follow equation:
A˜= {(x,µA(x))|x ∈X} with µA :X→ [0,1]. (1)
These membership functions are typically linear and have of-
ten the shape of a triangle, trapezoid, sigmoidal or Gaussian
bell. Exemplary, the Gaussian bell shape is describe with the
following membership function:
µA(x)=

0 x ≤ a,
exp−1/p(x) a < x < b,
0 x ≥ b
(2)
More flexible classes of membership functions are also possi-
ble, an example of the description of the breakdown behavior
probability of a system is shown in Peikert et al. (2015).
As in the classical set theory, fuzzy sets have their own
mathematical operators such as union, intersection and com-
plement (Fig. 1). This three typically aggregation operators
of two sets A as µA(x) and B as µB(x) are based on Takagi
and Sugeno (T–S) model Aliev (2013) and defined as follow:
union : A∪B⇔ µA∪B(x)
= µA(x)∪µB(x)=max {µA(x),µB(x)} ,
intersection : A∩B⇔ µA∩B(x)
= µA(x)∩µB(x)=min {µA(x),µB(x)} ,
complement : Aˆ⇔ µ
Aˆ
(x)= 1−µA(x).
Instead to the classical set theory, the mathematical oper-
ation on fuzzy sets are based on the membership functions.
The operation for classical sets are shown in Fig. 1a–c and
leads for A∪B to {x,y,z}, for A∩B to {y} and the comple-
ment leads for Aˆ to {z}. In contrast, the fuzzy set theory ob-
tained results (Fig. 1d) for a max-min rule is show in Table 1.
The degree of truth that an element belongs to the union of
some fuzzy sets is the maximum of the degrees of truth that
the element belongs to each of the fuzzy sets. For the inter-
section it is the minimum and for complement of a fuzzy set
is one deducted by the degree of truth that the element be-
longs to the fuzzy set.
3 Prediction of the risk-level by analytical description
To predict the risk at system level of a complex electronic
installation (example the complete IT-System of a critical in-
frastructure) it is necessary to characterize the behavior of
each subsystem. Furthermore, it is important to characterize
the environment of the investigated infrastructure with their
buildings and surrounding areas. In the paper of (Peikert et
al., 2015) a fuzzy membership function for the breakdown
failure probability (BFP) from (Genender et al., 2011a) is
presented and are used to predict the BFPra, in which “ra”
means the random angle of incident, of each subsystem and
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Figure 2. (a) BFPra membership function (Peikert et al., 2015) and (b) breakdowns of each MCU subsystem.
Figure 3. Mapping of the availability on the probability of occurrence (a) and the cost on the probability of occurrence (b) by Sabath and
Garbe (2015).
is calculated as follows:
µBFPra(x;α,β)=

0 x ≤ 0,
x∫
0
f (t;α,β)dt 0 < x ≤ 1
1 x > 1
(3)
where f (t;α,β) is the standard beta probability density
function (PDF),
f (t;α,β)=

1
B(α,β)
tα−1(1− t)β−1 0≤ t ≤ 1,
0 otherwise
(4)
and B(α,β) is the beta function. The shape of the beta model
is completely determined by the two shape parameter, α and
β and depending on the applied EM field EMC is shown in
Fig. 2a.
To predict the risk level for the system with the consid-
eration of its environment, a map of accessibility zones and
needed mobility (Genender et al., 2014) is used. In Fig. 6b
the infrastructure with their buildings and surrounding are il-
lustrated.
This information of the IEMI scenario are not enough to
predict the risk. Non-physical data are added with linguistic
terms. This data can be the accessibility to the infrastructure,
the mobility of a source, the availability of a source and any
other experts opinion to improve the prediction of the risk
level (Peikert et al., 2015). In the work of Sabath and Garbe
(2015) the opinion of different experts are published, for ex-
ample in Fig. 3 are the opinion of the experts for the avail-
ability and the cost for an IEMI source illustrated. The bars in
Fig. 3 depict the different rating from the experts. This leads
to imprecise data and is typical for the risk classification. The
fuzzy approach is perfect to handle these uncertainty and lin-
guistic terms from Fig. 3.
4 Test environment and system setup
A compound of different microcontroller circuits is used as
the victim system in determination of breakdown failure lev-
els and is illustrated in Fig. 4. The compound obtain one
main system (CORE MCU) which communicate with every
other one and is protected in a shielding box. The MCU sub-
systems are divided in three different systems. The first one
(MCU 1-x) works in series and need for the calculation the
result from the one before. The second system (MCU 2-x)
operates as a redundant system and have varied circuit lay-
outs. The layouts consider different EMC methodologies as
grounding or placing of components. The last system (MCU
3-x) communicate to the core system with different proto-
cols. The chosen protocols are Ethernet, twi and spi. The
various protocols and every subsystem leads to a different
behavior in a IEME. The whole system is used as the victim
system and shown in Fig. 4a. A block diagram of the func-
tion and interconnection of the whole system are shown in
Fig. 4b. For the test environment an open GTEM-cell is used.
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Figure 4. (a) Compound of different microcontroller and (b) block diagram of the MCU.
Figure 5. (a) The fuzzification and fuzzy rules of the expert opinions and (b) are the risk level membership function.
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Figure 6. (a) Fuzzy sets and their fuzzification rules and (b) the area zones with risk level for IEMI-Sources.
The compound is exposed by a double exponential pulse of
the PBG7 from the company Kentech.
For one minute the system is exposed by 200, 500, 1000,
2000 or 5000 pulses at different positions in the GTEM-cell.
The different positions lead to a different electric field mag-
nitude. The results of the malfunction of the 300 repetition
and a field amplitude of 20 kV m−1 are shown in Fig. 2b.
5 Risk prediction
The prediction of the risk level for the victim system includes
the breakdown behavior of the microcontroller compound
(Fig. 2a), the knowledge of the area (Fig. 6b) and of pos-
sible IEMI sources (Fig. 3). The expert opinions are uses as
the fuzzy rules in the fuzzification and defuzzification block
which is shown in Fig. 5a and are defined as If – Then fuzzy
rules. The inputs are defined by the vector e1 to en and lead
to the output u.
An example to estimate the hazard level as a function of
the mobility, the scale of accessibility challenge, the likeli-
hood of occurrence and the detection level for IEMI sources
is shown in Fig. 6a. More than 500 rules are used to deter-
mine the hazard level. The four inputs are combined with the
AND-Operator and lead to a hazard level of this combina-
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tion by the fuzzy rule. A general rule for the fuzzy system
in Fig. 6a is: If A and B and C and D then Hazard Level(x).
The expert opinions are used to improve the rules for the risk
estimation. The more precisely the knowledge of experts de-
scribe the system, the better the risk can be estimated.
The results of the technology challenge, mobility-, threat-
and hazard level of the fuzzy systems lead to a probability
of occurrence and a possible field strength. Both results are
mapped on the risk level membership function (Fig. 5b) and
lead to risk estimation of the system.
The obtained results have to integrate onto the area plan
(Fig. 6b) with the zones of accessibility and their mobility
level. The zone number four with the mobility level of five
stands for the victim system. The complete area are divided
into rectangle with a fix size of the area. For every rectangle
the distance to the victim system is calculated. The distance
and the accessibility zone of the rectangle leads to possible
IEMI sources and its maximum field amplitude. The far field
conditions leads to an attenuation of the field strength by a
factor of 1/r , in which r is the distance from a source to
the victim system. The obtained field strength and the result
of the risk level of the IEMI source are combined with the
breakdown probability of the victim system leads to a risk
level. This is calculated for every rectangle and the results
are mapped into the area plan. The result of the risk level
matrix for the area plan of the zone of accessibility is shown
in Fig. 6b. This map shows locations in which a IEMI source
can harm the victim system. In this example the victim sys-
tem is located in the upper right corner of the area and a IEMI
source in zone number two right of the victim system has a
risk level of 0.6 (yellow filled rectangle) to harm the system.
This location is a point of interest for a better protection of
the system and has to consider in the EMC shielding of the
system.
6 Conclusions
We show the usage of the theoretical approach published
in Peikert et al. (2015) for a real complex electronic sys-
tem and its environment. This method helps to analyze the
risk of a system exposed to IEMI. It combines physical (e.g.
BFP) as well as non-physical quantities (e.g. linguistic terms
and experts opinions), non-precise and uncertainness data
for the analysis. The fuzzy risk analysis approach combines
the breakdown behavior of an electronic system with the
infrastructure and the surrounding area, demonstrated for a
compound of different microcontroller circuits. The fuzzy
method delivers a estimation of a risk level matrix of the area,
which provides points of interest. This points of interest show
locations of IEMI sources which can harm the victim system
and have to consider in the EMC protection plan.
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